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    The capacity for reflective self-authorship is an all-or-... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→Equal moral status can be grounded in the all-or-nothing capacity for reflective self-authorship even if individuals exercise this capacity to varying degrees in practice.

    The capacity for reflective self-authorship is an all-or-nothing capacity rather than one that admits of degrees.

    Moral ResponsibilityRights & Liberty
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    Equal moral status can be grounded in the all-or-nothing capacity for reflective...What grounds equal status is possession of the capacity, not the degree to which...

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    This capacity for reflective self-authorship is all-or-nothing rather ...97%Equal moral status can be grounded in the all-or-nothing capacity for ...85%Moral status tracks the degree to which one possesses the reflective c...77%Equal moral status cannot be grounded in reflective capacity alone, be...75%

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    SEP: autonomy-moral
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    The answer may be that our normative commitments do not arise from our actual capacities to reflect and to choose (though we must have such capacities to some minimal degree), but rather from the way in which we must view ourselves as having these capacities. We give special weight to our own present and past decisions, so that we continue on with projects and plans we make because (all other things being equal) we made them, they are ours, at least when we do them after some reflective delibera

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