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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Even a maximally expansive probabilistic outcomes framework cannot capture the moral implications of risk-taking per se.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The moral implications of risk-taking per se are not inherent properties of any of the potential outcomes.
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    • 2.A probabilistic outcomes framework, even when outcomes are defined to include rights infringements, intentionality, and other mental states, only captures properties of outcomes.
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    • 3.Therefore, the moral significance of imposing risk itself — independent of which outcome obtains — falls outside the scope of any outcomes-based probabilistic framework.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.T.M. Scanlon's contractualism identifies wrongness with what cannot be reasonably rejected, a relational property obtaining at the time of action regardless of outcome.
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    • 2.Imposing nonconsensual risk constitutes a wrongful relation between agent and victim even in possible worlds where no harm materializes, as Claire Finkelstein's work on risk and consent demonstrates.
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    • 3.No assignment of probabilities over outcome-states can represent this relational wrongness, since it is instantiated prior to and independent of any outcome distribution.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Judith Jarvis Thomson's distinction between harming and wronging entails that an agent can wrong a victim without producing any harm-constituting outcome.
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    • 2.Risk imposition wrongs the victim by treating her as a mere means to the agent's ends, a Kantian deontic fact that supervenes on the structure of the action, not on its causal consequences.
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    • 3.Expected-value and probabilistic frameworks are structurally incapable of representing action-structural or deontic facts, as they assign moral weight exclusively to states of the world rather than to the normative character of agency itself.
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