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    Explanations are not all-or-nothing; there are degrees of... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Challenges→There need not be a conceptual path from concepts or predicates of the reducing science to concepts or predicates of the reduced science for an explanation to count as a reduction.

    Explanations are not all-or-nothing; there are degrees of explanatory depth.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    Some explanations exceed mere brute-fact postulates without achieving the tight ...There need not be a conceptual path from concepts or predicates of the reducing ...

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    Thus, even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel’s model, we should not speak of proper reduction, if as a matter of epistemic possibility the connection between the domains of the two theories remains too loose to support the materialist claims. Levine (1993) gives this an epistemological interpretation; Chalmers (1996) seems to suggest that the epistemic possibility of two concepts coming apart implies that there is a metaphysical possibility of the two propertie

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