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    There need not be a conceptual path from concepts or pred... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    There need not be a conceptual path from concepts or predicates of the reducing science to concepts or predicates of the reduced science for an explanation to count as a reduction.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Nagel's classical model requiring bridge laws was refuted by Putnam's multiple realizability: mental states map onto heterogeneous physical substrates with no uniform conceptual bridge.
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    • 2.Kim's functional reduction shows that causal-mechanistic sufficiency—not conceptual entailment—is what licenses genuine explanatory reduction across levels.
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    • 3.Explanatory reduction succeeds when the reducing science specifies the realizer of the reduced property, even absent any a priori derivation of the higher-level predicate.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Machamer, Darden, and Craver's mechanistic explanation demonstrates that inter-level reduction proceeds via mechanism schemas, not conceptual-definitional linkage between predicates.
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    • 2.The neuroscientific reduction of long-term potentiation to molecular cascades counts as genuine reduction despite no conceptual path from 'memory consolidation' to 'AMPA receptor phosphorylation'.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Explanations are not all-or-nothing; there are degrees of explanatory depth.
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    • 2.Some explanations exceed mere brute-fact postulates without achieving the tight conceptual connections required by those who demand an a priori link between the reduced and reducing science.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Key Terms

    Conceptual path(as used in philosophy of science and epistemology)
    A logical connection or chain of reasoning that links one idea to another—the ability to understand how one concept leads to or explains another.
    Predicates(in logic and philosophy of language)
    Words or phrases that describe properties or characteristics of something—like 'is red' or 'is tall' in the sentence 'The ball is red.'
    concepts(Pietroski (2018))
    Mental representations of a certain kind
    reduced science(as used in philosophy of science and reduction)
    A scientific field or theory that is being explained by breaking it down into simpler parts or more fundamental principles.
    reduction/reducing science(the main subject of the statement)
    When scientists explain something complicated using simpler, more basic concepts or laws—like explaining biology using chemistry, or chemistry using physics.

    Related

    Explanations are not all-or-nothing; there are degrees of explanatory depth.Explanatory reduction succeeds when the reducing science specifies the realizer ...Kim's functional reduction shows that causal-mechanistic sufficiency—not concept...Machamer, Darden, and Craver's mechanistic explanation demonstrates that inter-l...
    +3 moreShow less
    Nagel's classical model requiring bridge laws was refuted by Putnam's multiple r...Some explanations exceed mere brute-fact postulates without achieving the tight ...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: scientific-reduction
    View source passageHide passage
    Thus, even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel’s model, we should not speak of proper reduction, if as a matter of epistemic possibility the connection between the domains of the two theories remains too loose to support the materialist claims. Levine (1993) gives this an epistemological interpretation; Chalmers (1996) seems to suggest that the epistemic possibility of two concepts coming apart implies that there is a metaphysical possibility of the two propertie
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The neuroscientific reduction of long-term potentiation to molecular cascades co...

    Similar

    A reduction of a concept cannot legitimately presuppose that concept i...86%An adequate definition of the reduction-predicate must capture the int...84%Ontological reduction is distinct from epistemic reduction in terms of...80%Reduction requires not just referential identity but also conceptual e...80%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit