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    Facts, understood as obtaining states of affairs in the t... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Normative reasons are not true propositions.

    Facts, understood as obtaining states of affairs in the tradition of Armstrong and early Wittgenstein, are ontologically distinct from true propositions even when they are co-extensional.

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    Key Terms

    Armstrong
    # Armstrong Armstrong most commonly refers to **Neil Armstrong** (1930-2012), an American astronaut and aeronautical engineer who became the first human to walk on the Moon on July 20, 1969. He is remembered as a pioneering explorer whose famous words—"That's one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind"—marked humanity's first footsteps on another celestial body. Armstrong's achievement remains one of the most significant moments in human history and symbolizes the height of space exploration and scientific achievement.
    Co-extensional(describing when two things match up but aren't necessarily connected in a meaningful way)
    Having exactly the same members or applying to exactly the same things, even if for completely different reasons.
    Ontologically distinct(as what Aristotle argues perception and reason are NOT)
    Completely separate in what they actually *are* as things—not just different functions, but fundamentally different kinds of existence.
    Wittgenstein
    Ludwig Wittgenstein was an Austrian-British philosopher who fundamentally changed how people think about language and meaning in the 20th century. He argued that many philosophical problems arise from misunderstanding how words actually work in everyday life, rather than from deep metaphysical mysteries. His ideas influenced not just philosophy but also mathematics, logic, and even how people approach psychology and artificial intelligence today.

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    facts(Used as relata in form (1) of the correspondence theory)
    States of affairs that obtain; unlike states of affairs in general, facts cannot serve as meanings of false sentences without absurd consequences
    states of affairs(Stumpf's terminology in his contribution to logic)
    The specific content of judgment (belief)
    true propositions(in metaphysics and logic)
    Statements that accurately describe reality, like 'water boils at 100 degrees Celsius' is a true proposition.

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

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    Normative reasons are not true propositions.

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