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    Normative reasons are not true propositions. — Carmelics
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    Normative reasons are not true propositions.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Reasons function as explanatory and justificatory relata in practical reasoning, not as truth-apt representations of states of affairs.
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    • 2.Bernard Williams's internalism demonstrates that reasons must connect to an agent's motivational set, which propositions qua abstract objects cannot do.
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    • 3.If normative reasons were true propositions, the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen) would be unresolvable, since propositions lack the evaluative directionality reasons require.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.John Broome's distinction between 'that'-clauses and facts shows that what reasons consist in are worldly facts, not the propositional contents that represent them.
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    • 2.Facts, understood as obtaining states of affairs in the tradition of Armstrong and early Wittgenstein, are ontologically distinct from true propositions even when they are co-extensional.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Propositions are abstract and representational (they represent the way the world is).
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    • 2.Normative reasons must be concrete and non-representational (they are ways the world is).
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    • 3.If something is abstract and representational, it cannot be concrete and non-representational.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    Related

    Bernard Williams's internalism demonstrates that reasons must connect to an agen...Facts, understood as obtaining states of affairs in the tradition of Armstrong a...If normative reasons were true propositions, the 'wrong kind of reason' problem ...If something is abstract and representational, it cannot be concrete and non-rep...
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    John Broome's distinction between 'that'-clauses and facts shows that what reaso...Normative reasons must be concrete and non-representational (they are ways the w...Propositions are abstract and representational (they represent the way the world...Reasons function as explanatory and justificatory relata in practical reasoning,...

    Similar

    Normative reasons are true propositions.93%Intuition can only furnish a reason for holding a proposition to be tr...88%The fact that a proposition appears true to us is not a valid logical ...86%Self-evident propositions have no logical reasons that prove their tru...86%

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    SEP: reasons-just-vs-expl
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    Among those who hold that normative reasons are facts, some hold that facts are true propositions and hence that reasons are also true propositions (Darwall 1983; Smith 1994; Scanlon 1998). Others reject the idea that normative reasons could be true propositions; for instance, Dancy (2000) does so on the grounds that propositions are abstract and representational (they represent the way the world is) but reasons must be concrete and non-representational (they are ways the world is). These proble
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit