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    For affective empathy to be genuine, the empathizer's aff... — Carmelics
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    For affective empathy to be genuine, the empathizer's affective state must be directed toward the same intentional object as the target's affective state, not merely share a similar phenomenal quality.

    Moral Responsibility
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Vicarious sharing of an affect is more than being in an affectively similar state.
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    • 2.The empathizer's affective state must be about what makes the other person feel the way they do.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Phenomenal contagion—catching another's fear without grasping its object—still constitutes a primitive, genuine form of affective empathy recognized by Hoffman's empathy-altruism research.
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    • 2.Requiring intentional object-sharing conflates empathy with the more cognitively demanding capacity of perspective-taking, collapsing a distinction central to developmental psychology.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.On Scheler's account, emotional resonance (Nachfühlen) is grounded in a direct non-inferential sharing of felt quality prior to any identification of intentional objects.
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    • 2.Imposing intentional object-matching as a necessary condition presupposes a Brentanian internalist framework that phenomenologists like Zahavi explicitly reject in favor of intercorporeal attunement.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Key Terms

    Affective empathy(as used in philosophy of emotions and ethics)
    Feeling what someone else feels—like when you cry at a sad movie or smile when a friend gets good news. It's different from just understanding someone's emotions intellectually.
    Affective state(as used in philosophy of emotions)
    Your emotional or feeling condition at a given moment—like being happy, sad, anxious, or angry.
    Phenomenal quality(as used in philosophy of mind)
    What an experience actually feels like from the inside—the raw sensation or 'what-it-is-like-ness' of an emotion or perception. For instance, sadness has its own unique feel that's different from anger.
    intentional object(Koons (2018))
    An object that can be thought; in Koons's framework, a qua-object or trope that is a metaphysical part of a base object.

    Related

    Imposing intentional object-matching as a necessary condition presupposes a Bren...On Scheler's account, emotional resonance (Nachfühlen) is grounded in a direct n...Phenomenal contagion—catching another's fear without grasping its object—still c...Requiring intentional object-sharing conflates empathy with the more cognitively...
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    The empathizer's affective state must be about what makes the other person feel ...Vicarious sharing of an affect is more than being in an affectively similar stat...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: empathy
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    Affective and proper Empathy: More narrowly and properly understood, empathy in the affective sense is the vicarious sharing of an affect. Authors however differ in how strictly they interpret the phrase of vicariously sharing an affect. For some, it requires that the empathizers and the persons they empathize with need to be in very similar affective states (Coplan 2011; de Vignemont and Singer 2006; Jacob 2011). For Hoffman, on the other hand, it is an emotional response requiring only “the in
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    The empathizer's affective state must be about what makes the other pe...89%Proper empathy can be understood broadly to include vicarious sharing ...86%A vicarious emotional response requires that the empathizer's affectiv...85%Adam Smith already exemplified a broad understanding of empathy that e...84%
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