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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    For an agent S to have an ability to perform action A, it... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→Metaphysical possibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an agent's ability to perform an action

    For an agent S to have an ability to perform action A, it is necessary that it be possible that S does A

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    Moral ResponsibilityModality & Possibility

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    Metaphysical possibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an agen...There are metaphysically possible acts that an agent nonetheless cannot perform,...

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    To develop this purported truism, begin with the thought that for S to have an ability to A it is necessary, but not sufficient, that it be possible that S does A. This claim will be contentious for various more specialized sorts of possibility, such as nomic possibility. But if we may help ourselves to the idea of possibility simpliciter (‘metaphysical possibility,’ on at least one reading of that phrase), then this claim appears plausible. (We will survey some historical and contemporary chall

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