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    Metaphysical possibility is a necessary but not sufficien... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Metaphysical possibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an agent's ability to perform an action

    Modality & PossibilityMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.For an agent S to have an ability to perform action A, it is necessary that it be possible that S does A
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    • 2.There are metaphysically possible acts that an agent nonetheless cannot perform, showing possibility is not sufficient
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dispositional ability analyses (e.g., Ryle, Fara) ground abilities entirely in actual behavioral dispositions, making metaphysical possibility neither necessary nor sufficient.
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    • 2.A fragile vase has the metaphysical possibility of surviving a fall but lacks any disposition toward survival, showing possibility tracks ability only accidentally.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Frankfurt's mesh theories of freedom, an agent's ability is constituted by the alignment of first- and second-order volitions, not by modal facts about what is possible.
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    • 2.Modal accessibility across possible worlds is silent on the internal volitional structure that Frankfurt argues is the actual ground of genuine agentive ability.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityModality & Possibility

    Related

    A fragile vase has the metaphysical possibility of surviving a fall but lacks an...Dispositional ability analyses (e.g., Ryle, Fara) ground abilities entirely in a...For an agent S to have an ability to perform action A, it is necessary that it b...Modal accessibility across possible worlds is silent on the internal volitional ...
    +2 moreShow less
    On Frankfurt's mesh theories of freedom, an agent's ability is constituted by th...There are metaphysically possible acts that an agent nonetheless cannot perform,...

    Similar

    There are metaphysically possible acts that an agent nonetheless canno...90%For an agent S to have an ability to perform action A, it is necessary...86%An agent has the ability to do something only if there is a possible w...85%Compatibilists require only that there be some possibility of the agen...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: abilities
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    To develop this purported truism, begin with the thought that for S to have an ability to A it is necessary, but not sufficient, that it be possible that S does A. This claim will be contentious for various more specialized sorts of possibility, such as nomic possibility. But if we may help ourselves to the idea of possibility simpliciter (‘metaphysical possibility,’ on at least one reading of that phrase), then this claim appears plausible. (We will survey some historical and contemporary chall
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit