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    For every concrete individual x, if x is a person, then x... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    For every concrete individual x, if x is a person, then x is a property instance.

    Divine Attributes
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • For every concrete individual x, x is a property instance of some rich property or other.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Bare particular theory (Bergmann, Moreland) holds that concrete individuals possess a substratum that instantiates properties but is not itself a property instance.
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    • 2.If the concrete individual x just is a property instance, there is no ontological ground for the unity of properties in a single persistent subject.
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    • 3.Divine simplicity doctrine itself requires God to be beyond property-instantiation, so identifying persons with property instances entails God cannot be a person—a theologically unacceptable result.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Persons are paradigmatically subjects of experience, not abstract qualitative instances—Strawson's 'basic particulars' are irreducible to property bundles.
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    • 2.If persons were property instances, personal identity across time would collapse into qualitative similarity, contradicting Chisholm's strict criterion of haecceity-based identity.
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    Divine Attributes

    Related

    Bare particular theory (Bergmann, Moreland) holds that concrete individuals poss...Divine simplicity doctrine itself requires God to be beyond property-instantiati...For every concrete individual x, x is a property instance of some rich property ...If persons were property instances, personal identity across time would collapse...
    +2 moreShow less
    If the concrete individual x just is a property instance, there is no ontologica...Persons are paradigmatically subjects of experience, not abstract qualitative in...

    Similar

    For every concrete individual x, x is a property instance of some rich...90%No person is a property instance—not God, not me, not Socrates.84%Concrete individuals cannot be identified with property instances.80%For each concrete individual x there is a corresponding rich property ...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: divine-simplicity
    View source passageHide passage
    Mann’s argument for the thesis that everything is a property instance involves the notion of a rich property. The rich property of an individual x is a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are all and only the essential and accidental properties, some of them temporally indexed, instantiated by x throughout x’s career (2015, 38). Mann tells us that for anything whatsoever there is a corresponding rich property. From this he concludes that “everything is a property instance of some rich property or other” (38). It follows that every person is a property instance. The argument seems to be...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit