For phenomenal concepts, conceivability tracks metaphysical possibility more reliably than for ordinary empirical concepts, because phenomenal concepts refer directly via acquaintance rather than via contingent descriptions.

?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

Contingent descriptions(an alternative way ordinary concepts can refer to things): Explanations that depend on how things happen to be in the world, rather than on what something essentially is; descriptions that could be different but happen to apply.
Refer directly via acquaintance(how phenomenal concepts connect to what they're about): To point to or mean something by experiencing it firsthand, like how you know pain by actually feeling it, rather than by describing it from a distance.
conceivability(Qualified as 'properly circumscribed' to distinguish it from naive or unreflective conceivability): The ability to coherently imagine or suppose a state of affairs without contradiction
empirical concepts(as used in epistemology): Ideas that are built from what we experience through our senses, like the concept of 'red' or 'hot,' which you only understand because you've seen or felt those things.

Based on where you are in your exploration