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    Conceptual possibility is too weak to establish metaphysi... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Conceptual possibility is too weak to establish metaphysical possibility without further qualification and argument.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.It is conceptually possible that Michael Tye is not actually Michael Tye (e.g., an impostor or someone misinformed about his past).
      ?

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    • 2.Given the actual facts, it is metaphysically impossible that Michael Tye is not Michael Tye.
      ?

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    • 3.Therefore, conceptual possibility does not entail metaphysical possibility.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.For phenomenal concepts, conceivability tracks metaphysical possibility more reliably than for ordinary empirical concepts, because phenomenal concepts refer directly via acquaintance rather than via contingent descriptions.
      ?

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    • 2.The Michael Tye impostor case fails as a disanalogy because it exploits description-mediated reference, whereas zombie conceivability arguments exploit purely demonstrative, acquaintance-based reference that cannot misfire in the same way.
      ?

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    • 3.If phenomenal concept reference is essentially indexical and non-descriptive, then the gap between conceptual and metaphysical possibility that Kripke identifies for natural kinds and persons does not generalize to phenomenal properties.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Chalmers' two-dimensional semantic framework distinguishes primary intensions from secondary intensions, allowing conceivability arguments to be run at the level of primary possibility without illicitly inferring secondary metaphysical possibility.
      ?

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    • 2.When a scenario is positively conceivable under the primary intension of all terms involved, this constitutes evidence of genuine metaphysical possibility that the supporting argument's single-intension treatment of 'conceptual possibility' fails to rebut.
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    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    Chalmers' two-dimensional semantic framework distinguishes primary intensions fr...For phenomenal concepts, conceivability tracks metaphysical possibility more rel...Given the actual facts, it is metaphysically impossible that Michael Tye is not ...If phenomenal concept reference is essentially indexical and non-descriptive, th...
    +4 moreShow less
    It is conceptually possible that Michael Tye is not actually Michael Tye (e.g., ...The Michael Tye impostor case fails as a disanalogy because it exploits descript...Therefore, conceptual possibility does not entail metaphysical possibility.When a scenario is positively conceivable under the primary intension of all ter...

    Similar

    Granting conceptual possibility alone does not entail metaphysical pos...87%Therefore, conceptual possibility does not entail metaphysical possibi...86%Blockhead is not a nomic or physical possibility, even if Blockhead is...82%Empirical Strong AI makes a weaker, possibility claim rather than a ne...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: qualia
    View source passageHide passage
    One well-known physicalist reply to the case of zombies (Loar 1990) is to grant that they are conceptually possible, or at least that there is no obvious contradiction in the idea of a zombie, while denying that zombies are metaphysically possible. Since the anti-physicalist argument requires metaphysical possibility — mere conceptual possibility will not suffice — it now collapses. That conceptual possibility is too weak for the anti-physicalist’s purposes (at least without further qualificatio
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit