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    Forming an intention to kill does not by itself breach an... — Carmelics
    Home/Consequentialism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Forming an intention to kill does not by itself breach an agent-relative obligation when acting on that intention is impossible and good consequences would result.

    Consequentialism
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Agent-relative obligations attach to killing in execution of an intention, not to bare intention formation.
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    • 2.If one cannot act so as to fulfill an intention to kill, the obligatory component requiring action is not satisfied.
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    • 3.An obligation not to intend alone would impermissibly block forming intentions justified by good consequences when action is impossible.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Intentions constitute the moral character of agency; Kant and Anscombe both hold that intending to kill already corrupts the will regardless of feasibility.
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    • 2.An agent-relative obligation against killing derives from the inviolability of persons as ends, which is violated in intention, not merely in action.
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    • 3.Permitting consequence-justified intentions when action is impossible creates a standing disposition to kill that degrades moral character and erodes the absolute constraint.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Warren Quinn's doctrine of double effect analysis establishes that agents bear responsibility for what they intend, since intentions define the plan they make themselves party to.
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    • 2.The claim that impossibility of action dissolves the wrongness of the intention proves too much, licensing conditional intentions to kill whenever circumstances might change.
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    Topics

    Consequentialism

    Related

    Agent-relative obligations attach to killing in execution of an intention, not t...An agent-relative obligation against killing derives from the inviolability of p...An obligation not to intend alone would impermissibly block forming intentions j...If one cannot act so as to fulfill an intention to kill, the obligatory componen...
    +4 moreShow less
    Intentions constitute the moral character of agency; Kant and Anscombe both hold...Permitting consequence-justified intentions when action is impossible creates a ...The claim that impossibility of action dissolves the wrongness of the intention ...Warren Quinn's doctrine of double effect analysis establishes that agents bear r...

    Similar

    If agent-relative obligations were based on intention alone (e.g., not...92%A merely negligent killing does not breach an agent-relative obligatio...90%If agent-relative obligations were based on action alone (e.g., not to...86%If one cannot act so as to fulfill an intention to kill, the obligator...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: ethics-deontological
    View source passageHide passage
    By requiring both intention and causings to constitute human agency, this third view avoids the seeming overbreadth of our obligations if either intention or action alone marked such agency. Suppose our agent-relative obligation were not to do some action such as kill an innocent –is that obligation breached by a merely negligent killing, so that we deserve the serious blame of having breached such a categorical norm (Hurd 1994)? (Of course, one might be somewhat blameworthy on consequentialist
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit