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    Frankfurt's hierarchical account of agency requires secon... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The standard theory of agency is not too demanding, even if some non-human beings capable of agency lack representational mental states

    Frankfurt's hierarchical account of agency requires second-order volitions, which presuppose representational states, making non-representational agency conceptually subordinate rather than genuinely continuous with full agency.

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    Key Terms

    Frankfurt
    Frankfurt most commonly refers to **Frankfurt am Main**, a major city in Germany known as a global financial hub, home to the European Central Bank and many international banks. It's also famous for its historic architecture, museums, and its role as one of Europe's most important transportation and business centers. The name can also refer to **Harry Frankfurt**, an influential American philosopher known for his work on free will, moral responsibility, and human motivation—particularly his concept of "caring about what we care about."
    agency(Used to assess whether switching the trolley is deontologically prohibited.)
    A morally relevant sense in which an agent is the direct cause of harm, invoked in deontological constraints; its absence removes a deontological bar to acting.
    conceptually subordinate(as how non-representational agency is positioned relative to full agency)
    Treated as less important or less real by the theory; considered a weaker or lower-status version of something.
    hierarchical account of agency(as Frankfurt's main theory of how we exercise control)

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    A theory that says real freedom and control come from having different levels of desires—you have basic desires (like wanting coffee), but you also have second-order desires (desires about what you want to want).
    non-representational agency(as an alternative form of agency being contrasted)
    The ability to act and make choices without needing thoughts or mental representations—more like how animals might act on pure instinct.
    representational states(as what second-order volitions depend on)
    Mental states that are *about* something—like thoughts, beliefs, or ideas that represent or point to things in the world.
    second-order volitions(Augustine's distinction between orders of volition)
    Acts of the liberum voluntatis arbitrium by which one chooses between conflicting first-order volitions

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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

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    The standard theory of agency is not too demanding, even if some non-human being...

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