Frankfurt's hierarchical account of agency requires second-order volitions, which presuppose representational states, making non-representational agency conceptually subordinate rather than genuinely continuous with full agency.
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A theory that says real freedom and control come from having different levels of desires—you have basic desires (like wanting coffee), but you also have second-order desires (desires about what you want to want).
non-representational agency(as an alternative form of agency being contrasted)
The ability to act and make choices without needing thoughts or mental representations—more like how animals might act on pure instinct.
representational states(as what second-order volitions depend on)
Mental states that are *about* something—like thoughts, beliefs, or ideas that represent or point to things in the world.
second-order volitions(Augustine's distinction between orders of volition)
Acts of the liberum voluntatis arbitrium by which one chooses between conflicting first-order volitions