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    Freedom would be a property of the self as a thing in its... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→We cannot theoretically know that we are free.

    Freedom would be a property of the self as a thing in itself.

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeModality & Possibility
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    Modality & PossibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

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    We cannot know anything about things in themselves.We cannot theoretically know that we are free.

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    AI-extracted
    SEP: kant
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    But, second, if “we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them,” then we cannot have a priori knowledge about things whose existence and nature are entirely independent of the human mind, which Kant calls things in themselves (Bxviii). In his words: “[F]rom this deduction of our faculty of cognizing a priori […] there emerges a very strange result […], namely that with this faculty we can never get beyond the boundaries of possible experience, […and] that such cogni

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