Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Functionalist accounts (Putnam, Lewis) define mental stat... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→Mental predicates cannot constitute mentality, because mentality is presupposed by the mental predicates themselves.

    Functionalist accounts (Putnam, Lewis) define mental states by causal-functional roles specifiable without prior mentalistic vocabulary.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Mental states are multiply realizable across different physical substrates, suggesting identity with abstract functional roles rather than physical properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.We can specify pain's causal role (stimulus→state→behavior) without presupposing 'pain' exists, using only input-output descriptions and internal transitions.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Functionalism explains mental causation: mental states cause behavior precisely because they occupy functional roles in causal networks.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Inverted qualia and absent qualia scenarios show functional identity doesn't guarantee identical phenomenal experience or consciousness itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Defining mental states purely functionally presupposes we know which causal relations matter—but this intuitive selection seems to require prior mentalistic understanding.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The 'Chinese Room' problem suggests systems with identical functional organization may lack genuine intentionality or understanding that mental states possess.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Defining mental states purely functionally presupposes we know which causal rela...Functionalism explains mental causation: mental states cause behavior precisely ...Inverted qualia and absent qualia scenarios show functional identity doesn't gua...Mental predicates cannot constitute mentality, because mentality is presupposed ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Mental states are multiply realizable across different physical substrates, sugg...The 'Chinese Room' problem suggests systems with identical functional organizati...We can specify pain's causal role (stimulus→state→behavior) without presupposing...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit