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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Functionalist accounts (Putnam, Lewis) define mental states by causal-functional roles specifiable without prior mentalistic vocabulary.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Inverted qualia and absent qualia scenarios show functional identity doesn't guarantee identical phenomenal experience or consciousness itself.
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    • 2.Defining mental states purely functionally presupposes we know which causal relations matter—but this intuitive selection seems to require prior mentalistic understanding.
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    • 3.The 'Chinese Room' problem suggests systems with identical functional organization may lack genuine intentionality or understanding that mental states possess.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Mental states are multiply realizable across different physical substrates, suggesting identity with abstract functional roles rather than physical properties.
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    • 2.We can specify pain's causal role (stimulus→state→behavior) without presupposing 'pain' exists, using only input-output descriptions and internal transitions.
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    • 3.Functionalism explains mental causation: mental states cause behavior precisely because they occupy functional roles in causal networks.
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