Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    ¬G_F is equivalent to ∃x Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉), so models satis... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Non-standard models of F must contain 'infinite' non-natural numbers beyond all natural numbers.

    ¬G_F is equivalent to ∃x Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉), so models satisfying ¬G_F must contain entities witnessing the formula Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉).

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Because Prf_F(x, y) strongly represents the proof relation, F can prove ¬Prf_F(n...Non-standard models of F must contain 'infinite' non-natural numbers beyond all ...The witnessing entities in non-standard models must therefore be entities other ...

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Modality & Possibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Therefore no natural number n can witness the formula Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉) in any non...

    Similar

    Γ implies C only if C is satisfied by every model in MΓ rather than ev...83%Henkin's theorem establishes that every consistent set of formulas has...80%In M, the sentence θ_CH has a model A, meaning M models 'A models θ_CH...80%If a theory F has independent statements (such as the Gödel sentence G...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: goedel-incompleteness
    View source passageHide passage
    It is illuminating to reflect on the first incompleteness theorem also from the model theoretic perspective—though the theorem itself does not in any way require this. Namely, it is possible to conclude that any theory \(F\) satisfying the conditions of the theorem must possess, in addition to the intended interpretation or “standard model” (in the case of arithmetical theories, the structure of natural numbers), non-intended interpretations or “non-standard models”—that no such theory can rule

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective