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    Non-standard models of F must contain 'infinite' non-natu... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Non-standard models of F must contain 'infinite' non-natural numbers beyond all natural numbers.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.¬G_F is equivalent to ∃x Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉), so models satisfying ¬G_F must contain entities witnessing the formula Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉).
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    • 2.Because Prf_F(x, y) strongly represents the proof relation, F can prove ¬Prf_F(n̲, ⌈G_F⌉) for every standard numeral n̲.
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    • 3.Therefore no natural number n can witness the formula Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉) in any non-standard model.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The term 'infinite non-natural numbers' imports set-theoretic ontology into a purely syntactic result about provability within formal systems.
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    • 2.Non-standard models are model-theoretic artifacts relative to a metatheory; their 'non-standard elements' need not be reified as numbers of any kind.
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    • 3.Skolem's original (1933) construction of non-standard arithmetic was intended to show the indeterminacy of the natural number concept, not to populate models with a new category of object.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The argument presupposes that 'strongly represents' the proof relation in F suffices to transfer facts about standard numerals to all elements of non-standard models, but this inference requires the metatheory to already privilege the standard model.
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    • 2.On a strict formalist reading (cf. Curry, Detlefsen's 'Hilbert's Program'), there is no well-defined notion of 'natural number' outside a formal system against which model elements can be measured as 'non-standard'.
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    Related

    Because Prf_F(x, y) strongly represents the proof relation, F can prove ¬Prf_F(n...Non-standard models are model-theoretic artifacts relative to a metatheory; thei...On a strict formalist reading (cf. Curry, Detlefsen's 'Hilbert's Program'), ther...Skolem's original (1933) construction of non-standard arithmetic was intended to...
    +5 moreShow less
    The argument presupposes that 'strongly represents' the proof relation in F suff...The term 'infinite non-natural numbers' imports set-theoretic ontology into a pu...The witnessing entities in non-standard models must therefore be entities other ...Therefore no natural number n can witness the formula Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉) in any non...¬G_F is equivalent to ∃x Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉), so models satisfying ¬G_F must contain...

    Similar

    The witnessing entities in non-standard models must therefore be entit...92%Therefore no natural number n can witness the formula Prf_F(x, ⌈G_F⌉) ...85%Such a non-standard model cannot be isomorphic to the natural numbers ...83%Robinson's non-standard analysis is based on infinitesimals and their ...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: goedel-incompleteness
    View source passageHide passage
    It is illuminating to reflect on the first incompleteness theorem also from the model theoretic perspective—though the theorem itself does not in any way require this. Namely, it is possible to conclude that any theory \(F\) satisfying the conditions of the theorem must possess, in addition to the intended interpretation or “standard model” (in the case of arithmetical theories, the structure of natural numbers), non-intended interpretations or “non-standard models”—that no such theory can rule
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit