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    Game theorists should not generalize about epistemic prio... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Game theorists should not generalize about epistemic priorities meant to apply to any rational agent in all situations.

    Skepticism
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.When players face surprising behavior in a game, their strategies depend on how their beliefs would be revised.
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    • 2.Belief revision depends on epistemic priorities—whether an unexpected action is an isolated mistake or reveals something about future behavior.
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    • 3.These epistemic priorities vary by situation and cannot be uniformly prescribed.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Bayesian rationality provides a domain-general framework for belief revision that applies to any agent with coherent credences.
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    • 2.Savage's sure-thing principle and Jeffrey conditionalization yield universal norms for updating on unexpected evidence.
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    • 3.If epistemic priorities can be formalized as priors, then rational agents share structural updating rules regardless of situational context.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aumann's common prior assumption demonstrates that rational agents with shared information must converge on identical posteriors.
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    • 2.If epistemic divergence in games stems from differing priors rather than differing rationality norms, the solution is shared priors, not pluralism about epistemic priorities.
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    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Moral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    Aumann's common prior assumption demonstrates that rational agents with shared i...Bayesian rationality provides a domain-general framework for belief revision tha...Belief revision depends on epistemic priorities—whether an unexpected action is ...If epistemic divergence in games stems from differing priors rather than differi...
    +4 moreShow less
    If epistemic priorities can be formalized as priors, then rational agents share ...Savage's sure-thing principle and Jeffrey conditionalization yield universal nor...These epistemic priorities vary by situation and cannot be uniformly prescribed.When players face surprising behavior in a game, their strategies depend on how ...

    Similar

    These epistemic priorities vary by situation and cannot be uniformly p...86%Naturalized epistemology does not share this explicit normative aim77%The normative reasons an agent has depend on the agent's epistemic per...75%Expressive-priority theories deny that responses that are only beliefs...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: epistemic-game
    View source passageHide passage
    Faced with surprising behavior in the course of a game, the players must decide what then to believe. Their strategies will be based on how their beliefs would be revised, which will in turn be based on their epistemic priorities—whether an unexpected action should be regarded as an isolated mistake that is thereby epistemically independent of beliefs about subsequent actions, or whether it reveals, intentionally or inadvertently, something about the player’s expectations, and so about the way s
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit