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    If epistemic divergence in games stems from differing pri... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Game theorists should not generalize about epistemic priorities meant to apply to any rational agent in all situations.

    If epistemic divergence in games stems from differing priors rather than differing rationality norms, the solution is shared priors, not pluralism about epistemic priorities.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Rational agents with identical priors will converge to identical posterior beliefs via Bayesian updating, eliminating substantive disagreement.
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    • 2.Epistemic pluralism about rationality norms introduces unresolvable meta-level disagreements that shared priors would avoid entirely.
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    • 3.Game-theoretic solutions require common knowledge of beliefs; shared priors provide this foundation better than norm pluralism.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Priors themselves reflect deeper epistemic commitments; 'shared priors' merely relocates rather than resolves divergence.
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    • 2.Rational agents can legitimately weigh evidence differently based on distinct epistemic values (reliability vs. informativeness), not just priors.
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    • 3.Game contexts often make rational norm-plurality adaptive; mandating shared priors removes agents' contextual flexibility.
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    Related

    Epistemic pluralism about rationality norms introduces unresolvable meta-level d...Game contexts often make rational norm-plurality adaptive; mandating shared prio...Game theorists should not generalize about epistemic priorities meant to apply t...Game-theoretic solutions require common knowledge of beliefs; shared priors prov...
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    Priors themselves reflect deeper epistemic commitments; 'shared priors' merely r...Rational agents can legitimately weigh evidence differently based on distinct ep...Rational agents with identical priors will converge to identical posterior belie...

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