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    'Good' does not mean the same as any naturalistic predica... — Carmelics
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    Supports→There is a property of goodness that is not identical to any naturalistic property of X-ness

    'Good' does not mean the same as any naturalistic predicate X

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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    The meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands (premise 3)There is a property of goodness that is not identical to any naturalistic proper...Therefore 'good' stands for a property distinct from any naturalistic property

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    This brings us back to the Open Question Argument. So far as I can see, Russell continued to accept premises (1) and (2) and thus—with reservations—sub-conclusion (4). “Good” does not mean that same as any naturalistic predicate X—at least, it does not mean the same as any of the naturalistic predicates that have been suggested so far. But he also accepts something like premise (3), that the meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands. It was because he believed that some predicat

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