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    There is a property of goodness that is not identical to ... — Carmelics
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    There is a property of goodness that is not identical to any naturalistic property of X-ness

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.'Good' does not mean the same as any naturalistic predicate X
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    • 2.The meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands (premise 3)
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    • 3.Therefore 'good' stands for a property distinct from any naturalistic property
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Premise 2 of the supporting argument embeds a Fregean theory of meaning that conflates sense with reference, which Kripke and Putnam's causal-historical semantics rejects.
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    • 2.If predicates refer via causal chains rather than descriptive meaning, 'good' could rigidly designate a naturalistic property even if its meaning differs from naturalistic predicates.
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    • 3.Cornell Realists (Boyd, Sturgeon) ground moral predicates in homeostatic property clusters, providing a naturalistic referent without analytic reduction.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The Open Question Argument assumes analyticity is the only way properties can be identical, but properties can be identical without synonymous predicates (Kripke).
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    • 2.Natural properties like H2O and water are identical despite 'water is H2O' not being analytically true, so 'good' could pick out a natural property non-analytically.
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    Related

    'Good' does not mean the same as any naturalistic predicate XCornell Realists (Boyd, Sturgeon) ground moral predicates in homeostatic propert...If predicates refer via causal chains rather than descriptive meaning, 'good' co...Natural properties like H2O and water are identical despite 'water is H2O' not b...
    +4 moreShow less
    Premise 2 of the supporting argument embeds a Fregean theory of meaning that con...The Open Question Argument assumes analyticity is the only way properties can be...The meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands (premise 3)Therefore 'good' stands for a property distinct from any naturalistic property

    Similar

    Moral properties, under moral naturalism, are identical to or constitu...86%There is no non-natural property of goodness85%Moral properties such as goodness cannot be defined in wholly psycholo...85%Normative properties are identical to natural properties84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: russell-moral
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    This brings us back to the Open Question Argument. So far as I can see, Russell continued to accept premises (1) and (2) and thus—with reservations—sub-conclusion (4). “Good” does not mean that same as any naturalistic predicate X—at least, it does not mean the same as any of the naturalistic predicates that have been suggested so far. But he also accepts something like premise (3), that the meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands. It was because he believed that some predicat
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit