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    Guidance control is (partially) dependent on responsivene... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Guidance control is (partially) dependent on responsiveness to reasons.

    Moral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.An agent under hypnosis, brainwashing, or irresistible urges is not responsive to reasons—his behavior would be the same no matter what reasons there were.
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    • 2.Such agents lack guidance control and are therefore not morally responsible.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Frankfurt's hierarchical mesh theory grounds guidance control in the structural relationship between first- and second-order desires, not in reasons-responsiveness.
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    • 2.An agent whose will conforms to her reflectively endorsed second-order volitions exercises guidance control even if she would not respond differently to external reasons.
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    • 3.This entails that guidance control is fully explicable without making responsiveness to reasons a partial constitutive condition, contra Fischer and Ravizza.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Agents with certain phobias or OCD act from compulsion yet retain guidance control over peripheral behaviors, showing responsiveness and control can dissociate.
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    • 2.If guidance control can be present where reasons-responsiveness is locally absent, responsiveness is not a necessary condition for guidance control.
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    Moral Responsibility

    Related

    Agents with certain phobias or OCD act from compulsion yet retain guidance contr...An agent under hypnosis, brainwashing, or irresistible urges is not responsive t...An agent whose will conforms to her reflectively endorsed second-order volitions...Frankfurt's hierarchical mesh theory grounds guidance control in the structural ...
    +3 moreShow less
    If guidance control can be present where reasons-responsiveness is locally absen...Such agents lack guidance control and are therefore not morally responsible.This entails that guidance control is fully explicable without making responsive...

    Similar

    Reasons-responsiveness is sufficient to ground ascriptions of control ...83%Strong reasons-responsiveness cannot be required for guidance control.81%A strongly reasons-responsive mechanism would both recognize and respo...79%Guidance control does not require access to alternatives; it is manife...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted3/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-responsibility
    Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 37
    View source passageHide passage
    A number of factors can undermine guidance control. If a person’s behavior is brought about by hypnosis, brainwashing, or genuinely irresistible urges, then that person may not be morally responsible for her behavior since she does not reflectively guide it in the way required for responsibility (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 35). More specifically, an agent in the above circumstances is not likely to be responsible because he “is not responsive to reasons—his behavior would be the same, no matter what reasons there were” (1998: 37). Thus, Fischer and Ravizza characterize possession of guidance ...
    Extraction notes

    The passage explicitly uses the examples of hypnosis, brainwashing, and irresistible urges to illustrate that lack of reasons-responsiveness undermines guidance control, thereby supporting the conclusion that guidance control is partially dependent on responsiveness to reasons.

    Validity:

    Confidence: Explicitly argued in the passage.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit