Hellman's modal structuralism provides face-value readings of mathematical claims as truths about possible structures rather than abstract objects, satisfying the same data about speaker intentions.
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abstract objects(The target of Platonist ontological claims)
Objects referred to by singular terms in literally true sentences that cannot be paraphrased away; includes mathematical objects (e.g., numbers), propositions, properties, relations, sentence types, possible worlds, logical objects, and fictional objects.
modal(in logic and metaphysics)
Dealing with possibility and necessity—questions about what could be true, what must be true, and what's merely contingent (could go either way).
speaker intentions(philosophy of language)
What the person using a word means or intends by it—their mental purpose for saying it.