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    Herbart's claim presupposes a quasi-substantial continuit... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→One representation cannot completely crowd out a second representation from consciousness.

    Herbart's claim presupposes a quasi-substantial continuity of mental content that empiricist psychology explicitly rejects as metaphysical smuggling.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Herbart posits mental content persists as unified representations across time, requiring ontological substance beyond discrete sensory impressions.
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    • 2.Empiricists like Hume reject enduring mental entities, treating mind as bundles of momentary perceptions without underlying continuity.
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    • 3.Assuming mental content maintains identity presupposes metaphysical commitment to substance empiricists explicitly deny as unobservable.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Continuity of mental content can derive from causal laws and functional relationships without positing quasi-substantial entities.
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    • 2.The distinction between 'empiricist' positions is internal; many empiricists accept dispositional or structural continuity without metaphysical substance.
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    • 3.Herbart's claims about representation may be empirically testable through psychological evidence, not purely metaphysical speculation requiring substance.
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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPerception1 linked

    Related

    Assuming mental content maintains identity presupposes metaphysical commitment t...Continuity of mental content can derive from causal laws and functional relation...Empiricists like Hume reject enduring mental entities, treating mind as bundles ...Herbart posits mental content persists as unified representations across time, r...
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    Herbart's claims about representation may be empirically testable through psycho...One representation cannot completely crowd out a second representation from cons...The distinction between 'empiricist' positions is internal; many empiricists acc...

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    claim
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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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