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    Hilary Putnam's internal realism holds that truth conditi... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The truth-aptness argument does not establish that moral facts exist

    Hilary Putnam's internal realism holds that truth conditions are fixed by our best theories, and moral discourse has the functional structure of a best-theory domain.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Moral discourse exhibits systematic structure: we revise moral views based on coherence, consistency, and explanatory power, like scientific theories.
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    • 2.Internal realism avoids both naive moral realism and relativism by grounding truth in our best justified frameworks rather than mind-independent facts.
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    • 3.If moral claims lack truth conditions independent of our theories, they can still be objectively constrained by rational discourse standards.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Science aims to describe mind-independent reality; morality seems fundamentally prescriptive, not descriptive—disanalogous functional structures.
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    • 2.Making truth depend on 'our best theories' risks circularity: whose theories? This threatens to collapse into relativism or conventionalism.
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    • 3.Moral realists argue moral properties (like wrongness) are discovered, not constructed—internal realism cannot explain moral determinacy this way.
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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    If moral claims lack truth conditions independent of our theories, they can stil...Internal realism avoids both naive moral realism and relativism by grounding tru...Making truth depend on 'our best theories' risks circularity: whose theories? Th...Moral discourse exhibits systematic structure: we revise moral views based on co...
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    Moral realists argue moral properties (like wrongness) are discovered, not const...Science aims to describe mind-independent reality; morality seems fundamentally ...The truth-aptness argument does not establish that moral facts exist

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