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    The truth-aptness argument does not establish that moral ... — Carmelics
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    The truth-aptness argument does not establish that moral facts exist

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.A set of truth-apt sentences cannot conjure the referents of those sentences into existence
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    • 2.The same points about propositional surface apply to theological discourse, which need not entail that God exists
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    • 3.It is possible that moral opinions are predominantly false, as with propositions of Greek mythology, even if they are truth-apt
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Crispin Wright's superassertibility account shows truth-aptness in a domain generates prima facie ontological commitment to that domain's subject matter.
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    • 2.If moral discourse exhibits cognitive command and wide cosmological role, as Wright argues, the default position shifts to realism absent defeating conditions.
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    • 3.The theological analogy fails because moral discourse, unlike theological discourse, is not optional—it is constitutive of practical reasoning itself.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Hilary Putnam's internal realism holds that truth conditions are fixed by our best theories, and moral discourse has the functional structure of a best-theory domain.
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    • 2.The error-theory escape route invoked in P3 is self-undermining: systematic moral falsehood would eliminate the normative standards needed to identify the error.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    Related

    A set of truth-apt sentences cannot conjure the referents of those sentences int...Crispin Wright's superassertibility account shows truth-aptness in a domain gene...Hilary Putnam's internal realism holds that truth conditions are fixed by our be...If moral discourse exhibits cognitive command and wide cosmological role, as Wri...
    +4 moreShow less
    It is possible that moral opinions are predominantly false, as with propositions...The error-theory escape route invoked in P3 is self-undermining: systematic mora...The same points about propositional surface apply to theological discourse, whic...The theological analogy fails because moral discourse, unlike theological discou...

    Similar

    Under emotivism, the premises of moral arguments are not truth-apt — t...83%The Kantian argument against moral knowledge from experience is at bes...82%The conclusion of the argument is that moral beliefs lack justificatio...80%Error theory only requires that all substantive moral beliefs are fals...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: russell-moral
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    The main problem for most forms of non-cognitivism is that moral judgments look and behave like propositions—that is, in this connection, the kinds of things that can be true or false. They have, as the jargon has it, a “propositional surface”. We claim that such sentences are true or false, we speak of knowing the difference between good and bad, right and wrong (where knowledge would appear to entail truth), we wonder whether our ethical opinions are right or wrong (in the sense of correct or
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit