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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Hybrid ontological objects (intersections of mental, abstract, and physical categories) are metaphysically permissible

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's indispensability criterion demands that ontological commitment track explanatory necessity, not conceptual convenience.
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    • 2.Positing a hybrid object merely to preserve ordinary talk of 'languages' multiplies ontological categories without corresponding explanatory gain.
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    • 3.When a single entity must simultaneously satisfy incompatible individuation conditions (causal for physical, acausal for abstract), the entity is incoherent, not hybrid.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Chalmers and Jackson's two-dimensional semantics demonstrates that apparent category violations typically reflect confused intensional contexts, not genuine ontological novelty.
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    • 2.The supporting argument's dissolution of inconsistency via equivocation-diagnosis itself presupposes that 'mental', 'abstract', and 'physical' lack determinate extension, which undermines rather than licenses hybrid posits.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The incompatibility thesis rests on an equivocation of the terms 'mental', 'abstract', and 'physical'
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    • 2.Once the equivocation is cleared up, the apparent ontological inconsistency dissolves
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    • 3.Natural language has a nuanced nature that is simultaneously physical, mental, and 'abstractish'
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