Identity statements between phenomenal and neural properties require justification, and 'type-B' physicalists like Levine argue the conceivability of zombies shows the identity is not knowable a priori.
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conceivability(Qualified as 'properly circumscribed' to distinguish it from naive or unreflective conceivability)
The ability to coherently imagine or suppose a state of affairs without contradiction
identity statements(as used in logic and metaphysics)
Sentences that claim two things are the same, like 'water is H2O' or 'the morning star is the evening star.'
knowable a priori(epistemology)
Something you could potentially figure out through pure thinking and reasoning, without needing to look at the world or do experiments.
phenomenal properties(Used in the context of higher-order thought theory to refer to properties whose presence is explained by higher-order representations)
The qualitative, 'what-it-is-like' features of conscious experience that characterize how perceptual states feel to the subject
zombies (philosophical)(Used as a thought experiment against physicalism about consciousness)
Beings who are physically exactly like humans but have no conscious life