If a nominalist explains why object a is F by appealing to the fact that a is G and all Fs are Gs, the nominalist must then explain why a is G without appealing to the property of Gness.
(Kant's technical usage in §17 of the B-Deduction; to be read broadly as an objective feature of reality whose existence and nature is independent of how it is perceived)
That in the concept of which a manifold of a given intuition is united
predicate notation (F, G, a)(as the symbolic language used in the statement)
A shorthand way philosophers write: 'a' stands for an object, and 'F' and 'G' stand for properties or qualities that object might have.
property(Locke's demonstration of the moral proposition 'Where there is no property, there is no injustice.')
The Quine-Devitt response to the One Over Many begins with the claim that we can account for the fact that the ball is red, without appealing to the property of redness, by simply using whatever explanation scientists give of this fact. Now, by itself, this explanation will not satisfy advocates of the One Over Many argument. If we explain the fact that the ball is red by pointing out that its surface is structured in some specific way, then advocates of the One Over Many argument will say that