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    Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication s... — Carmelics
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    Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication sentence (P) is equivalent to a nominalist paraphrase sentence (N) and that neither entails the existence of a property.

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.On the paraphrase-nominalist view, (P) says the very same thing as (N).
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    • 2.Neither (P) nor (N), on this view, entails the existence of Gness.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's criterion of ontological commitment entails that quantifying over Fs in any sentence commits one to the existence of Fs.
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    • 2.A paraphrase sentence (N) that preserves truth conditions must quantify over the same entities as (P), preserving the original commitment.
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    • 3.Therefore, equivalence of (P) and (N) cannot eliminate the ontological commitment present in (P) without altering truth conditions.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Schiffer's 'something from nothing' objection holds that trivial inferences like 'x is courageous, therefore x has the property of courage' are valid.
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    • 2.If such inferences are valid, then any nominalist paraphrase (N) that is equivalent to (P) must also license the same inferences to property-talk.
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    • 3.A paraphrase strategy that blocks these licensed inferences changes the semantic content of (P), undermining the claimed equivalence.
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    Philosophy of Language

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    Modality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A paraphrase sentence (N) that preserves truth conditions must quantify over the...A paraphrase strategy that blocks these licensed inferences changes the semantic...If such inferences are valid, then any nominalist paraphrase (N) that is equival...Neither (P) nor (N), on this view, entails the existence of Gness.
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    On the paraphrase-nominalist view, (P) says the very same thing as (N).Quine's criterion of ontological commitment entails that quantifying over Fs in ...Schiffer's 'something from nothing' objection holds that trivial inferences like...Therefore, equivalence of (P) and (N) cannot eliminate the ontological commitmen...

    Similar

    Goodman's nominalist theory of properties holds that the properties an...87%Fictionalistic nominalism about propositions is viable, unlike paraphr...86%If a nominalist explains why object a is F by appealing to the fact th...85%Paraphrase nominalism fails in the case of propositions82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: platonism
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    On this view, (P) is equivalent to (N). That is, it says the very same thing. And neither sentence, according to this view, entails the existence of Gness. We can call this a paraphrase-nominalist view of sentences like (P). But nominalists needn't endorse this view. They can also endorse a fictionalist view of sentences like (P). On this view, (P) and (N) do not, strictly speaking, say the same thing, because (P) talks about the property of Gness and (N) does not. According to this fictionalist
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit