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    If a single entity possesses both intentional being (whic... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Giles of Rome's account of the ontological status of intelligible species is internally inconsistent

    If a single entity possesses both intentional being (which is not accidental inherence) and real accidental being (which is), then Giles' account assigns contradictory modes of existence to the same item without a principled criterion for adjudication.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

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    Key Terms

    Accidental inherence(metaphysics)
    A property that something has but doesn't need to have to be what it is—like how a cup is white, but a cup could be red and still be a cup.
    Contradictory modes of existence(metaphysics/logic)
    When something is claimed to exist in two completely opposite ways at the same time, which seems impossible and needs explanation.
    Giles(as the philosopher whose argument is being discussed)
    A medieval philosopher (likely Giles of Rome, 13th-14th century) who wrote about how substances and their properties work. He's known for his ideas about what things fundamentally are versus what properties they have.
    Intentional being(the other category of existence being discussed)
    Things that exist because they are in someone's mind or consciousness—like thoughts, dreams, or imagined objects.

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    Modes of existence(metaphysics/ontology)
    Different ways that something can exist—like how an idea exists differently than a physical object, even if they're about the same thing.
    Principled criterion for adjudication(logic/metaphysics)
    A clear, logical rule that helps you decide between two conflicting claims when they can't both be true at the same time.
    Real accidental being(metaphysics)
    An actual, physical property that something possesses in the world that isn't essential to its nature—like how a real cup actually is white in reality, but whiteness is not what makes it a cup.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

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    Giles of Rome's account of the ontological status of intelligible species is int...

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