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    Giles of Rome's account of the ontological status of inte... — Carmelics
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    Giles of Rome's account of the ontological status of intelligible species is internally inconsistent

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Giles treats intelligible species as both formal likenesses and efficient causal vehicles, assigning them simultaneously to two incompatible ontological registers.
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    • 2.Aristotelian hylomorphism permits no middle category between substance and accident, so any entity claimed to transcend this division generates a genuine contradiction within that framework.
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    • 3.Giles explicitly invokes the Aristotelian categories as the exhaustive ontological grid while simultaneously claiming species escape them, violating the principle of non-contradiction on his own terms.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aquinas resolves the analogous tension by strictly subordinating species to the esse intentionale/esse naturale distinction, a move Giles partially adopts but then undermines by also attributing real accidental inherence to the same species.
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    • 2.If a single entity possesses both intentional being (which is not accidental inherence) and real accidental being (which is), then Giles' account assigns contradictory modes of existence to the same item without a principled criterion for adjudication.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Giles' causal interpretation implies the species belongs to the same kind as the represented thing
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    • 2.Giles also holds that the species inheres in the intellect as an accident in a substance
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    • 3.Giles himself claims the species are neither substances nor accidents, yet can be 'reduced' to the kind of the represented thing
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    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

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    Related

    Aquinas resolves the analogous tension by strictly subordinating species to the ...Aristotelian hylomorphism permits no middle category between substance and accid...Giles also holds that the species inheres in the intellect as an accident in a s...Giles explicitly invokes the Aristotelian categories as the exhaustive ontologic...
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    Giles himself claims the species are neither substances nor accidents, yet can b...Giles treats intelligible species as both formal likenesses and efficient causal...Giles' causal interpretation implies the species belongs to the same kind as the...If a single entity possesses both intentional being (which is not accidental inh...These claims cannot be simultaneously satisfied without contradiction

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    SEP: giles
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    Giles’ account of knowledge is indebted to Aquinas, but, again, reveals many original features. In the first place, he insists on a strictly causal interpretation — be it direct or via a medium — of the cognitive process, both at the level of sensory and intellectual acts. Secondly, the Augustinian master doesn’t conceive of the role of “intelligible species” or formales expressiones as he often writes, as essential to the process of cognition in itself. As Giorgio Pini (2016) has shown, the int
    Extraction notes

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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit