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    If acquaintance with a probability-maker suffices for jus... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting that the making-probable relation is necessary—is a plausible reply that does not collapse into phenomenal conservatism.

    If acquaintance with a probability-maker suffices for justification, the view inherits phenomenal conservatism's permissiveness toward any internally coherent but misleading seeming.

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    Key Terms

    Internally coherent(describing philosophical frameworks)
    When a system of ideas holds together logically without contradicting itself—all the pieces fit together and make sense.
    Permissiveness(as used in ethics)
    The quality of being too lenient or allowing too many exceptions, which can undermine the strict principles someone is trying to establish.
    Probability-maker(philosophy of probability)
    Something that makes an event or claim more likely to be true; the underlying reason or fact that increases the chances of something happening.
    acquaintance(Russell's epistemology of singular reference)
    Russell's form of demonstrative identification, in which a subject is directly presented with an object (typically sense data) rather than an extra-mental individual
    justification

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    (Third condition of the tripartite account of knowledge)
    The condition on a knower's belief that excludes mere luck — the belief must be held in a way that is appropriate or warranted, not merely accidentally correct.
    misleading seeming(epistemology)
    Something that appears or feels true to you, but is actually false or deceptive—your intuition or experience is tricking you.
    phenomenal conservatism(The target view being challenged by the tainted source objection)
    The epistemological view on which a proposition's merely seeming true to a subject provides the subject with prima facie justification for believing that proposition

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    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

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    Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting that the making-probable ...

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