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    If at least some first-order properties are necessarily w... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The a priori probability that a given property P has the second-order property of being a rightmaking property of weight W is equal to the a priori probability that P has the second-order property of being a wrongmaking property of weight W.

    If at least some first-order properties are necessarily wrongmaking or necessarily rightmaking, then their second-order moral status is not a matter of a priori equiprobability but of conceptual necessity.

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    Key Terms

    Equiprobability(in probability and philosophy)
    When all options or possibilities are equally likely; everyone has the same chance.
    First-order properties(in ethics and metaphysics)
    The basic characteristics or qualities of things themselves—like 'causing suffering' or 'helping someone'—as opposed to properties about those properties.
    Necessarily wrongmaking/rightmaking(in moral theory)
    A property that must always make something wrong or right by its very nature, not just sometimes or by coincidence.
    Rightmaking(in ethics)
    A feature of an action or situation that makes it morally good or right.
    Second-order moral status(in ethics)

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    The moral standing or importance of the very features that make things right or wrong, rather than the status of actions themselves.
    Wrongmaking(in ethics)
    A feature of an action or situation that makes it morally bad or wrong.
    a priori(Frege treats 'analytic' as entailing 'a priori' for arithmetic.)
    Knowable independently of empirical experience; here treated as a consequence of analyticity.
    conceptual necessity(Used to characterize the link between essential properties and necessary truths)
    A truth that holds in virtue of the concepts involved, such that denying it would involve a conceptual contradiction

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    Problem of Evil1 linked

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    The a priori probability that a given property P has the second-order property o...

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