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    The a priori probability that a given property P has the ... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The a priori probability that a given property P has the second-order property of being a rightmaking property of weight W is equal to the a priori probability that P has the second-order property of being a wrongmaking property of weight W.

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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If one has a family of mutually exclusive properties, and P and Q are any two members of that family, then the a priori probability that something has property P is equal to the a priori probability that it has property Q.
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    • 2.The second-order property of being a rightmaking property of weight W and the second-order property of being a wrongmaking property of weight W belong to a family of mutually exclusive properties.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The principle of indifference cannot be coherently applied when the partition of a possibility space admits multiple non-equivalent descriptions yielding different probability assignments.
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    • 2.The family of second-order moral properties lacks a natural, non-arbitrary individuation criterion, meaning any appeal to equiprobability inherits Bertrand-style paradoxes of geometric probability.
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    • 3.Without a privileged partition, the symmetry argument for equal a priori probabilities between rightmaking and wrongmaking properties is undermined by the very formal framework it invokes.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Moral realist traditions from Plato through Ross hold that certain first-order properties—such as being-an-instance-of-suffering—have their normative valence necessarily, not contingently.
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    • 2.If at least some first-order properties are necessarily wrongmaking or necessarily rightmaking, then their second-order moral status is not a matter of a priori equiprobability but of conceptual necessity.
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    • 3.The existence of even one such necessary moral connection defeats the symmetry assumption required for the indifference-based probability claim.
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    Topics

    Problem of Evil

    Key Terms

    Rightmaking property(as used in normative ethics)
    A feature or characteristic of an action that makes it morally right or good—for instance, 'helping someone in need' might be a rightmaking property of an action.
    Second-order property(Frege's and Russell's account of existence)
    A property of concepts (for Frege) or of propositional functions (for Russell), rather than a property of individuals
    Weight(as used in ethics and value theory)
    The degree of importance or strength—in this context, how much a rightmaking or wrongmaking property matters in determining whether an action is good or bad.
    Wrongmaking property(as used in normative ethics)
    A feature or characteristic of an action that makes it morally wrong or bad—for example, 'causing unnecessary pain' might be a wrongmaking property of an action.
    a priori probability(Used in the context of measurement outcomes in quantum mechanics)
    A probability distribution for an experiment in which any two distinct outcomes are equally likely.
    property(Locke's demonstration of the moral proposition 'Where there is no property, there is no injustice.')
    A right to something.

    Related

    If at least some first-order properties are necessarily wrongmaking or necessari...If one has a family of mutually exclusive properties, and P and Q are any two me...Moral realist traditions from Plato through Ross hold that certain first-order p...The existence of even one such necessary moral connection defeats the symmetry a...
    +4 moreShow less
    The family of second-order moral properties lacks a natural, non-arbitrary indiv...

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
    View source passageHide passage
    To establish that the inductive step in the version of the evidential argument from evil set out above is sound requires a rather technical argument in inductive logic. But one can gain an intuitive understanding of the underlying idea in the following way. Suppose that there is a rightmaking property of which we have no knowledge. If an action of allowing a child to be brutally killed possessed that property, then it might not be wrong to allow that action, depending upon the weightiness of that unknown rightmaking property. But the existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more li...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    The principle of indifference cannot be coherently applied when the partition of...
    The second-order property of being a rightmaking property of weight W and the se...
    Without a privileged partition, the symmetry argument for equal a priori probabi...

    Similar

    The a priori probability that a given property P is a rightmaking prop...95%The upper bound on the probability that unknown rightmaking properties...83%The second-order property of being a rightmaking property of weight W ...82%The existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a p...82%