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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    It is not the case that If attributes alone individuate substances, then two numerically distinct substances cannot share an attribute, yet Spinoza's own system allows finite modes of one attribute to be genuinely distinct, undermining attribute-based individuation as a general principle.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The claim conflates individuation of substances with individuation of modes—these operate at different metaphysical levels in Spinoza's system.
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    • 2.Attributes individuate only substances (God's infinite expressions); finite modes are individuated by causal relations and intensive quantities, not attributes.
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    • 3.No contradiction arises if attribute-based individuation applies only to substances while modes follow distinct individuation principles.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Spinoza explicitly states finite modes within one attribute are numerically distinct by their modifications and intensive degrees, not by attribute.
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    • 2.If attributes alone individuate, two modes sharing an attribute must be identical, but Spinoza's system clearly permits their real distinction.
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    • 3.This internal inconsistency shows attribute-based individuation cannot be Spinoza's actual metaphysical principle for substance individuation.
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