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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If concepts F and G are distinct concepts, then F and G are not materially equivalent.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frege himself distinguished concept identity from co-extensionality: 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' share extension but differ intensionally.
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    • 2.Material equivalence is an extensional relation, but concepts individuated by sense (Sinn) can diverge even when their extensions are necessarily identical.
      ?

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    • 3.Therefore, F and G can be materially equivalent yet remain distinct concepts, falsifying the claim that distinct concepts cannot be materially equivalent.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Necessarily co-extensive concepts like 'triangular' and 'trilateral' are materially equivalent across all possible worlds yet are paradigmatically treated as distinct concepts in intensional semantics.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If material equivalence sufficed for concept identity, hyperintensional contexts—where substitution of co-extensive terms fails—would be semantically unintelligible, but they are not.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.In an extensional model of concepts, material equivalence of F and G is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the identity of F and G.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.F = G if and only if for all x, Fx if and only if Gx.
      ?

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