If divine concurrence allows creatures to be genuine causes despite God's necessarycausal role, a second god could be a sufficient secondary cause while the first remains a necessary primary cause.
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primary cause(Carroll's neo-Thomistic critique of indeterminacy-based divine action models)
In Thomistic philosophy, the foundational cause that supports and grounds all other (secondary) causes; God's causal role as sustainer of being, distinct in kind from creaturely efficient causation
secondary cause(Le Grand's account of body-body interaction)
A cause that directs or transfers local motions in virtue of the specific configurations of its parts, but does not possess the ultimate causal power to produce or cease movement.
sufficient cause(Applied specifically to the First's causal relation to its first effect)
A cause whose existence alone is enough to bring about the existence of its effect, without requiring any external instrument, material substrate, accident, or motion