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    A second god cannot be a causally sufficient condition (i... — Carmelics
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    A second god cannot be a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of any contingent being, given that a first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every other concrete object.

    Divine Attributes
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every other concrete object.
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    • 2.If the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every other concrete object, then no other being can be a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of any contingent being.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.A causally necessary condition and a causally sufficient condition are not mutually exclusive roles that cannot be jointly instantiated by distinct agents.
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    • 2.Aquinas's concurrentism holds that primary and secondary causes can both be fully operative at different causal levels without either negating the other's causal status.
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    • 3.If divine concurrence allows creatures to be genuine causes despite God's necessary causal role, a second god could be a sufficient secondary cause while the first remains a necessary primary cause.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The claim equivocates on 'causally necessary condition,' conflating metaphysical dependence with pre-emptive causal exclusion.
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    • 2.Leibniz's notion of compossibility demonstrates that multiple sufficient reasons can converge on a single effect without logical contradiction in a shared causal order.
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    • 3.Two omnipotent beings could each supply independently sufficient causal grounds for a contingent being's existence, making neither's sufficiency undermined by the other's necessity.
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    Topics

    Divine AttributesAgainst an aspect of God

    Key Terms

    Strong sense (in philosophy)(in philosophical argumentation)
    A strict or demanding interpretation of a concept, requiring more rigorous conditions than a weaker interpretation. Here it emphasizes that the condition truly produces something entirely on its own.
    causally necessary condition(Applied to the first god's relation to every other concrete object)
    A condition without which a given object could not exist; the existence of the object depends on this condition obtaining.
    causally sufficient condition(Gomes's account of causal conditionals)
    'A' is a causally sufficient condition for 'B' when 'A' specifies the occurrence of an event that would cause another event 'B', by stating a condition the truth of which is sufficient for inferring the truth of 'B'.
    concrete object(Foundational primitive in Zalta's system)
    An object that actually exists in the sense captured by the existence predicate E!x; taken as primitive.
    contingent being(Boethius's characterization of human beings to counter necessity-based arguments)
    A being whose existence is not necessary — it can fail to exist

    Connections

    1 topic

    Causation1 linked

    Related

    A causally necessary condition and a causally sufficient condition are not mutua...Aquinas's concurrentism holds that primary and secondary causes can both be full...If divine concurrence allows creatures to be genuine causes despite God's necess...If the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every oth...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: monotheism
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    (1*) is sufficient to yield our conclusion. For if the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every other concrete object, then the second god is not a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of any contingent being. Similarly, if the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being, then the second god is not a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete ob
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    +4 moreShow less
    Leibniz's notion of compossibility demonstrates that multiple sufficient reasons...The claim equivocates on 'causally necessary condition,' conflating metaphysical...The first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every other ...Two omnipotent beings could each supply independently sufficient causal grounds ...

    Similar

    A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the existence of at le...98%If the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sen...97%If the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of...96%The first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense)...93%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit