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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If dualism is true, consciousness in at least some of its types may be basic and fundamental, and thus cannot be explained as arising from nonconscious items.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Property dualism, as defended by Chalmers, holds that phenomenal properties are fundamental yet supervenient on physical substrates, not wholly inexplicable.
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    • 2.Supervenience relations between physical and phenomenal properties constitute a form of dependence that allows systematic explanation even if not reductive elimination.
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    • 3.Therefore, dualism does not entail that consciousness is unexplainable, only that its explanation terminates in brute psychophysical laws rather than reduction.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Russellian monism, advanced by Galen Strawson and others, treats phenomenal properties as the intrinsic categorical bases of physical dispositions, dissolving the dualist/physicalist dichotomy.
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    • 2.If consciousness is constitutive of the intrinsic nature of matter rather than ontologically separate from it, the claim that dualism renders consciousness inexplicable rests on a false dilemma.
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    • 3.The inference from 'consciousness is fundamental' to 'consciousness cannot be explained via nonconscious items' illicitly assumes that fundamentality excludes all structural or compositional accounts.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If dualism is true, then consciousness in at least some of its types may be basic and fundamental.
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    • 2.If consciousness is basic and fundamental, it does not arise from nonconscious items.
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    • 3.If consciousness does not arise from nonconscious items, then explaining how consciousness arises from nonconscious items is impossible.
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