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    Property dualism, as defended by Chalmers, holds that phe... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If dualism is true, consciousness in at least some of its types may be basic and fundamental, and thus cannot be explained as arising from nonconscious items.

    Property dualism, as defended by Chalmers, holds that phenomenal properties are fundamental yet supervenient on physical substrates, not wholly inexplicable.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Consciousness exhibits qualitative properties (qualia) absent from physical descriptions, suggesting phenomenal properties constitute a distinct fundamental level.
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    • 2.Supervenience without reduction preserves both consciousness's causal relevance and physics's explanatory completeness at their respective levels.
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    • 3.The hard problem demonstrates that physical facts alone cannot fully explain why experience feels like something, supporting phenomenal irreducibility.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Fundamental phenomenal properties violate parsimony: we gain no explanatory power by positing new basic properties beyond the physical.
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    • 2.Supervenience without reduction is conceptually unstable—if phenomenal properties depend entirely on physical facts, calling them 'fundamental' is misleading.
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    • 3.This view risks epiphenomenalism: if phenomenal properties are fundamental yet determined by physics, their causal role becomes unclear and potentially contradictory.
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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Consciousness exhibits qualitative properties (qualia) absent from physical desc...Fundamental phenomenal properties violate parsimony: we gain no explanatory powe...If dualism is true, consciousness in at least some of its types may be basic and...Supervenience without reduction is conceptually unstable—if phenomenal propertie...
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    Supervenience without reduction preserves both consciousness's causal relevance ...The hard problem demonstrates that physical facts alone cannot fully explain why...This view risks epiphenomenalism: if phenomenal properties are fundamental yet d...

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