Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If epiphenomenalism is true, it is explanatorily redundant to postulate mental states in others

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If epiphenomenalism is true, one's own mental states do not explain one's own behaviour
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.There is a sufficient physical explanation for the behaviour of others
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Postulating mental states in others adds no explanatory value when a complete physical explanation exists
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ockham's razor demands we not multiply entities beyond necessity when physical descriptions are causally complete (Lewis, 'An Argument for the Identity Theory').
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If epiphenomenal minds are causally inert, they cannot figure in the best explanation of any behavior, including verbal reports of inner states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A theory that cannot in principle be evidenced by any physical trace offers no predictive or explanatory gain over its absence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Huxley's epiphenomenalism entails mental states are nomologically supervenient shadows with no independent causal role in the physical world.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Jackson's knowledge argument shows qualia are non-physical, but epiphenomenalism then severs their connection to the behavioral evidence we use to attribute minds to others.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Attribution of mental states to others is warranted only if those states figure in inference to the best explanation of observed conduct, which epiphenomenalism structurally prohibits.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.