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    If epiphenomenalism is true, it is explanatorily redundan... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    If epiphenomenalism is true, it is explanatorily redundant to postulate mental states in others

    Consciousness & MindMoral Responsibility
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Ockham's razor demands we not multiply entities beyond necessity when physical descriptions are causally complete (Lewis, 'An Argument for the Identity Theory').
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    • 2.If epiphenomenal minds are causally inert, they cannot figure in the best explanation of any behavior, including verbal reports of inner states.
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    • 3.A theory that cannot in principle be evidenced by any physical trace offers no predictive or explanatory gain over its absence.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Huxley's epiphenomenalism entails mental states are nomologically supervenient shadows with no independent causal role in the physical world.
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    • 2.Jackson's knowledge argument shows qualia are non-physical, but epiphenomenalism then severs their connection to the behavioral evidence we use to attribute minds to others.
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    • 3.Attribution of mental states to others is warranted only if those states figure in inference to the best explanation of observed conduct, which epiphenomenalism structurally prohibits.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If epiphenomenalism is true, one's own mental states do not explain one's own behaviour
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    • 2.There is a sufficient physical explanation for the behaviour of others
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    • 3.Postulating mental states in others adds no explanatory value when a complete physical explanation exists
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge2 linked

    Related

    A theory that cannot in principle be evidenced by any physical trace offers no p...Attribution of mental states to others is warranted only if those states figure ...Huxley's epiphenomenalism entails mental states are nomologically supervenient s...If epiphenomenal minds are causally inert, they cannot figure in the best explan...
    +5 moreShow less
    If epiphenomenalism is true, one's own mental states do not explain one's own be...Jackson's knowledge argument shows qualia are non-physical, but epiphenomenalism...Ockham's razor demands we not multiply entities beyond necessity when physical d...Postulating mental states in others adds no explanatory value when a complete ph...There is a sufficient physical explanation for the behaviour of others

    Similar

    If epiphenomenalism is true, one's own mental states do not explain on...92%Postulating mental states in others adds no explanatory value when a c...77%The conscious mind is an epiphenomenon — a by-product of the physical ...75%Worries about epiphenomenal irrelevance have been raised with regard t...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: dualism
    View source passageHide passage
    The third problem concerns the rationality of belief in epiphenomenalism, via its effect on the problem of other minds. It is natural to say that I know that I have mental states because I experience them directly. But how can I justify my belief that others have them? The simple version of the ‘argument from analogy’ says that I can extrapolate from my own case. I know that certain of my mental states are correlated with certain pieces of behaviour, and so I infer that similar behaviour in othe
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit