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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If epistemic divergence in games stems from differing priors rather than differing rationality norms, the solution is shared priors, not pluralism about epistemic priorities.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Priors themselves reflect deeper epistemic commitments; 'shared priors' merely relocates rather than resolves divergence.
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    • 2.Rational agents can legitimately weigh evidence differently based on distinct epistemic values (reliability vs. informativeness), not just priors.
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    • 3.Game contexts often make rational norm-plurality adaptive; mandating shared priors removes agents' contextual flexibility.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Rational agents with identical priors will converge to identical posterior beliefs via Bayesian updating, eliminating substantive disagreement.
      ?

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    • 2.Epistemic pluralism about rationality norms introduces unresolvable meta-level disagreements that shared priors would avoid entirely.
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    • 3.Game-theoretic solutions require common knowledge of beliefs; shared priors provide this foundation better than norm pluralism.
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