If every demonstrative can be paraphrased by a causal-perceptual description that uniquely identifies its referent, then demonstratives are reducible to descriptions, contra the claim.
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(Used to argue that "I" is not a demonstrative because I-thoughts are possible without a presented referent)
An expression whose use requires the demonstrated object to be presented to conscious awareness
descriptions (in philosophy of language)(in philosophy of language)
Phrases that pick out something by listing its qualities or properties, like 'the tallest building in the city' instead of just pointing at it.
the claim (in reference to Kripke's theory of reference)(in philosophy of language and reference theory)
The argument made by philosopher Saul Kripke that demonstratives like 'this' and 'that' cannot be fully explained by descriptions alone—they have a special direct way of pointing at things.
uniquely identifies(in logic and reference theory)
Describes something in a way that points to exactly one thing and no other—there's no confusion about which thing you mean.