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    The irreducibility of demonstrative identification to des... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    The irreducibility of demonstrative identification to descriptive identification holds even if the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is true

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Let Bill and Bill* be distinct objects that differ in at least one quality, making their distinctness consistent with PII
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    • 2.Sally is unaware of the quality that distinguishes Bill from Bill*, so Bill and Bill* are qualitatively indiscernible as far as Sally is concerned
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    • 3.Intuitively, Sally is thinking of Bill and not Bill* despite being unable to descriptively distinguish them
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.A subject's epistemic limitations regarding distinguishing properties do not establish an ontological or semantic gap between demonstrative and descriptive modes of identification.
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    • 2.The description 'the object causally responsible for this perceptual state' is available to Sally and uniquely picks out Bill, grounding her demonstrative in a disguised definite description.
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    • 3.If every demonstrative can be paraphrased by a causal-perceptual description that uniquely identifies its referent, then demonstratives are reducible to descriptions, contra the claim.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.The PII guarantees that any two distinct objects differ in at least one qualitative property, meaning a sufficiently complete description always uniquely identifies each object.
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    • 2.If PII is true, Sally's apparent inability to distinguish Bill from Bill* reflects only her contingent ignorance, not any in-principle limit on descriptive identification.
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    • 3.The irreducibility argument illicitly conflates a practical epistemic limitation with a principled semantic thesis, making the conclusion about demonstrative irreducibility unwarranted.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Connections

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    Personal Identity2 linked

    Related

    A subject's epistemic limitations regarding distinguishing properties do not est...If PII is true, Sally's apparent inability to distinguish Bill from Bill* reflec...If Sally cannot descriptively distinguish Bill from Bill* yet demonstratively si...If every demonstrative can be paraphrased by a causal-perceptual description tha...
    +6 moreShow less
    Intuitively, Sally is thinking of Bill and not Bill* despite being unable to des...Let Bill and Bill* be distinct objects that differ in at least one quality, maki...Sally is unaware of the quality that distinguishes Bill from Bill*, so Bill and ...The PII guarantees that any two distinct objects differ in at least one qualitat...The description 'the object causally responsible for this perceptual state' is a...The irreducibility argument illicitly conflates a practical epistemic limitation...

    Similar

    The original argument for the irreducibility of demonstrative identifi...91%If Sally cannot descriptively distinguish Bill from Bill* yet demonstr...83%Descriptive identification depends on demonstrative identification, no...81%Individuals one cannot perceive must be identified descriptively rathe...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: propositions-singular
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    The argument we have presented above presupposes that Sally and Sally* and Bill and Bill* are numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible pairs of objects. Although many find this to be a genuine possibility, thanks in large part to Max Black (1952) and Robert Adams (1979), there is a long tradition that subscribes to the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), according to which, for any objects x and y, if, for every quality F, x is F if and only if y is F (i.e., if x and y are qualitativel
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit