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    If every party gains, the Pareto criterion alone suffices... — Carmelics
    Home/Justice & Punishment
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    Challenges→Kaldor's compensation criterion has dubious ethical value when compensatory transfers are actually performed

    If every party gains, the Pareto criterion alone suffices to approve the change

    ConsequentialismJustice & Punishment
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    Justice & PunishmentConsequentialism

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    If compensatory transfers are actually performed under Kaldor's criterion, then ...Kaldor's compensation criterion has dubious ethical value when compensatory tran...Therefore Kaldor's criterion adds nothing beyond the Pareto criterion when trans...

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    If compensatory transfers are actually performed under Kaldor's criter...80%The Pareto principle only approves changes that improve the situation ...75%Therefore Kaldor's criterion adds nothing beyond the Pareto criterion ...71%A criterion that permits reform when expected utility is higher is les...70%

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    SEP: economic-justice
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    The proponents of a “new” welfare economics (Hicks, Kaldor, Scitovsky) have distanced themselves from their predecessors (Marshall, Pigou, Lerner) by abandoning the idea of making social welfare judgments on the basis of interpersonal comparisons of utility. Their problem was then that in absence of any kind of interpersonal comparisons, the only principle on which to ground their judgments was the Pareto principle, according to which a situation is a global improvement if it is an improvement f

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