If F and G are not properties inhering in a subject but are identical with the divine essence viewed under different descriptions, then instantiating both F and G entails no mereological commitment.

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1 reason for

1 reason against

Reasons For

1 perspective

Reason for

1.Identity under different descriptions avoids requiring distinct metaphysical parts, as descriptions are linguistic rather than ontological.
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2.Mereology concerns composition of proper parts; properties identical with a simple essence cannot be compositional parts of it.
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3.Classical theism requires divine simplicity; the account preserves this by denying F and G are separate constituents.
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Reasons Against

1 perspective

Reason against

1.Even if F and G are identical to essence, instantiating both still requires explaining their apparent distinction without composition.
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2.Different descriptions may be linguistic, but instantiation concerns concrete exemplification—a separate metaphysical fact needing explanation.
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3.The claim assumes mereology is irrelevant to identity relations, but plurality of instantiated properties may itself demand mereological structure.
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Key Terms

Identical with(used to ask whether a playwright in an alternate scenario is actually Russell): Being the exact same person or thing, not just similar—in philosophy, this raises the question of what makes someone 'the same person' across different scenarios.
Instantiating(as used in logic and philosophy of mathematics): Actually creating or making real a specific example of something—like writing down the number 5 on a piece of paper is instantiating the abstract concept of five.
Mereology: The study of the relations between parts and wholes
different descriptions(as used in philosophy of language): Different ways of talking about or referring to the same thing using different words or concepts.
divine essence(Mersenne's Second Objections to Descartes): A genuine, coherent nature or essence corresponding to the concept of God, whose reality is a precondition for ontological arguments
entails(describes a logical relationship between statements): Logically forces or guarantees; if A entails B, then whenever A is true, B must also be true.
inhering in a subject(as used in metaphysics): Existing as a quality that belongs to and depends on some object or thing (the subject).
mereological commitment(as used in metaphysics): Taking on the burden of explaining how multiple parts or pieces fit together into a single whole.
properties(Contrasted with substances as ontologically dependent entities.): Entities that depend for their existence on substances, being properties of individual objects.

Connections

2 topics

Against an attribute of God1 linked Divine Attributes1 linked

Classical theism requires divine simplicity; the account preserves this by denyi...Different descriptions may be linguistic, but instantiation concerns concrete ex...

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 2 (1 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit